Security and encryption

Last updated: 23 September 2026

This is the page the encryption claim points at. It exists so the claim can be checked rather than taken on faith, and so the parts that are not covered are as easy to find as the parts that are.

We have been wrong about this before. Earlier versions of our privacy policy claimed encryption we did not ship — inherited copy from the project this app was forked from, rebranded without being re-verified. That correction is still on the Privacy Policy, and it stays there. It is the reason this page lists the gaps first-class instead of in a footnote.

The short version

When end-to-end encryption is active on a session, its chat messages and terminal output are encrypted on your own devices, and our servers hold only ciphertext for them. The keys are generated on your devices and the private halves never leave them.

It is not the case that everything in Mycolab is end-to-end encrypted. Session titles, project paths, machine names, timestamps, the names of the files you open, files you upload to artifacts, and broadcast notifications are not. Some of those are merely not built yet and some cannot work by construction — the sections below say which is which, because a gap we intend to close and a gap we cannot are not the same promise.

What is end-to-end encrypted

All of it uses AES-256-GCM, bound to the address of the thing it belongs to — a stream, a call, or a byte offset in a named file — so a sealed record cannot be replayed somewhere else and still open.

What is not end-to-end encrypted

Stated plainly, because this is the half that gets buried. It is split by why, because "we have not built it yet" and "this cannot work by construction" are very different promises and a single list hides that difference.

Not covered today — and there is no technical reason it can't be

These are ordinary backlog, not limits. We list them separately so the gap is a commitment rather than a shrug:

Two entries left this section in September 2026 rather than being fixed in place, which is worth stating because a page like this is usually edited in the safe direction. Service calls and file contents were both listed here as unbuilt; both are now encrypted and have moved up to the covered list. The file-contents entry used to explain at length why it was the *hardest* of these items — seeking into a large file, resuming an upload, and image previews that hand your browser a plain URL which cannot decrypt anything. All three were real, and all three are what the chunked format and the new preview path exist to solve.

Not covered because of how the system works

Not covered because you asked us to publish it

When encryption actually turns on

Two conditions have to hold. If either does not, the session is left unencrypted rather than half-encrypted or broken:

  1. At least one device in the workspace must have published a key. Sessions are sealed under a single key held by everyone the workspace is shared with, so with no published key there is nothing to hold it — and a session sealed to no one is one nobody can open, which is worse than an honest "not encrypted". Signing in on a device publishes its key.
  2. The workspace must have it enabled. Encryption is rolled out per workspace.

This changed on 23 September 2026, and the change is worth stating because it reversed something we previously told you. Until then a session key was wrapped individually to each of *your own* devices, once, when the session was created. Two things followed. A device that had published no key at that moment could never read that session, even after publishing one later — a permanent exclusion we described here as a trade-off. And, more seriously, a session shared with another person was reachable by them and unreadable, because their devices were never in the recipient list at all.

Both are now gone. A session key is sealed under a key held by every device of every workspace member and by every sharing link, so anyone admitted later can read what came before, and publishing a key on a device admits it to everything rather than to future sessions only.

The honest cost of that, stated plainly: one key now opens an entire workspace rather than one session, so it matters more than it did that the devices on the list are really yours. That is what the device list and the fingerprint you compare when enrolling a machine are for.

Sessions encrypted under the previous scheme cannot be converted — the old keys are held only by the devices they were wrapped to. Those sessions stay readable on those devices and show as "encrypted under a previous scheme" elsewhere. Create a new session to share one.

There used to be a third condition here — "new sessions only" — and it was not accurate. What is true is narrower and worth stating exactly: we do not retroactively encrypt anything we already received. Messages sent before your account had encryption stay readable by us, permanently, and re-sealing them would be theatre — we already have them. But an older session is not frozen: once it is opened by an up-to-date client it gains a key, and everything written into it after that point is sealed. So a long-running session can be readable in its early part and not in its later part, and the lock in the app means "this log is being sealed now", not "none of this was ever visible to us".

For the encrypted calls above there is one more condition, and it is worth stating because you can observe it: the machine you are calling must have published its public key. A machine running software older than this feature has not, so calls to it fall back to the unencrypted path rather than failing. We chose that over refusing to talk to your own computer — but it means "this call was encrypted" depends on the machine at the other end, not only on your account.

So turning encryption on does not claw back anything we have already received. It changes what happens next.

Keys, devices, and recovery

What this does and does not protect against

How to check it yourself

Everything else that protects your data

These apply to all sessions, encrypted or not:

Reporting a vulnerability

Email oeway007@gmail.com. Please include enough detail to reproduce it. We will confirm receipt, and we would rather hear about a problem than have it stay quiet.