Privacy Policy for Mycolab

Last Updated: 18 September 2026

⚠️ Correction notice (15 September 2026)

Every previous version of this policy overstated our encryption. It described a "zero-knowledge encryption architecture", said your conversations and code were "end-to-end encrypted on your device before transmission", and stated that we "cannot decrypt your data even if compelled" using "TweetNaCl (same as Signal)".

Those statements were not true of the software we ship. That text was inherited from the upstream project this app was forked from (slopus/happy, which does implement it) and was rebranded to Mycolab without being re-verified. In our build, the encryption layer is a pass-through: content is serialized and transmitted, not encrypted by us, and our servers can read it.

We are correcting this the moment we found it, rather than quietly softening the wording. If you chose Mycolab because of the previous claims, please read "What we can see" below and decide accordingly — we would rather lose your trust honestly than keep it on a false statement.

End-to-end encryption is planned, and the engineering analysis is public in docs/E2EE-FEASIBILITY.md. We will not claim it again until it is implemented, and until the keys are genuinely outside our reach.

Update (16 September 2026) — it now ships, for part of what we handle

End-to-end encryption is implemented and deployed. Chat messages and terminal output in newly created sessions are encrypted on your devices under keys we never receive. This does not cover session titles, project paths, machine names, timestamps, or uploaded file contents, and it does not apply to sessions created before it was enabled — those stay readable by us, permanently.

Update (18 September 2026) — it now covers commands, calls and file contents

Three more planes are encrypted since the note above, and the note above is left as written rather than widened, because a claim that grows by silent edit is the habit this page exists to break. Now also covered: terminal input (what you type, not just what prints), every call your app makes to one of your machines — arguments and reply — and the contents of the files you browse and edit in a session. Still not covered: session titles, project paths, machine names, timestamps, the names of the files you open, and anything you upload to artifacts.

The correction above stays on this page rather than being deleted. We claimed this once without shipping it; the fix for that is not to quietly replace the retraction with a fresh claim, but to leave both and let the dates speak. The precise boundary is on the Security and encryption page, and "What we can see" below is written to match it.

Overview

Mycolab lets you run and observe AI coding sessions on machines you own, from a browser or phone. Your session content travels through our servers (Hypha Mesh, running on Cloudflare) so that your devices can reach your machines.

This policy describes what we actually do today.

What we can see

For sessions that are not end-to-end encrypted, we can technically read your session content. That is every session created before encryption was enabled for your account, every session imported from a previous install, and any new session created while one of your devices is not yet enrolled.

For sessions that are end-to-end encrypted, what we can read shrinks to the last item. Chat messages, terminal output, terminal input, the arguments and replies of the calls your app makes to your machines, and the contents of the files you browse and edit are all encrypted on your devices under keys we never receive. What does not change: session titles, project paths, machine identifiers, lifecycle state, the timestamps and sizes of messages, the names and paths of the files you open, and anything you upload to artifacts. Encryption narrows what we can read; it does not make a session invisible to us. The full boundary is on the Security and encryption page.

We do not read this content as a matter of practice, and access is restricted internally. But the architecture does not prevent us from reading it, and it would not prevent a lawful compulsion order from reaching it. Please do not treat Mycolab as a confidential channel for secrets you cannot afford us — or a party who compels us — to see.

What protects your data today

These are real, and they are what we can honestly claim:

What we collect

Content

As listed under "What we can see" — messages, terminal output, artifact uploads, and session/machine metadata. For encrypted sessions we hold the messages and terminal output only as ciphertext, and the contents of files on your machine pass through us sealed; their names do not.

Operational metadata

What we do not collect

Analytics

The app derives a pseudonymous analytics identifier from your credential. This identifier is linkable back to your account by us — an earlier version of this policy claimed it was not, which was incorrect for the current sign-in mechanism.

How we use data

Data retention and deletion

Your rights

Depending on where you live (including under the GDPR if you are in the EU/EEA/UK), you may have the right to access, correct, export, or delete your personal data, to restrict or object to processing, and to lodge a complaint with your supervisory authority. Contact us to exercise these rights.

International transfers

Our infrastructure runs on Cloudflare's global network, and your data may be processed outside your country of residence, including in the United States. We do not currently operate EU-only data residency. End-to-end encryption now ships and is available as a supplementary safeguard for the content it covers — chat, terminal output and input, the calls your app makes to your machines, and the contents of files it reads and writes — but not for the metadata it does not cover (session titles, project paths, machine names, file names) or for artifact uploads, which still transfer and rest in a form we can read. EU-only residency remains on our roadmap; we will update this policy when it ships, and not before.

Third-party services

Changes to this policy

We will post material changes here with an updated date. Where a change corrects a previous misstatement, we will say so explicitly rather than editing silently, as we have done above.

Contact

Open an issue at <https://github.com/oeway/hypha-mesh> or contact the maintainers listed there.